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I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Stubbendieck,1 the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed
the first conviction for assisting suicide2 in state history,3 even though
the Nebraska Legislature had criminalized assisting suicide more
than forty years prior.4 The Nebraska Legislature made assisting sui-
cide a Class IV felony in 1977 by enacting section 28-307 of the Ne-
1. 302 Neb. 702, 924 N.W.2d 711 (2019).
2. In other jurisdictions across the United States, the language that assisting sui-
cide statutes use to describe the forbidden, criminal assistive conduct includes
“assisting,” “causing,” “encouraging,” “advising,” “aiding,” and “aiding and abet-
ting” suicide. See infra notes 52–59 and accompanying text. Although Americans
are probably most familiar with the term “assisted suicide” to describe the crime
of helping another person commit suicide, I have made the rhetorical choice to
use the term “assisting suicide” throughout this Note. I do this for two primary
reasons. First, the title of NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016) (the statute at
issue in Stubbendieck) uses the term “Assisting suicide.” Second, most Americans
likely associate the term “assisted suicide” with physician-assisted suicide. See
infra note 53 and accompanying text. Because the Stubbendieck case does not
deal with assisting suicide in the context of physician-assisted suicide, this Note
addresses assisting suicide law broadly and does not take up specific issues of
physician-assisted suicide. For a broader discussion on the importance of rhetori-
cal choices in legal discourse, see Samuel Baue, Ideographic Analysis of Matal v.
Tam: <Freedom of Speech>, <Property>, and Reappropriation 15 (Mar. 12, 2018)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Nebraska-Lincoln) (on file with the NE-
BRASKA LAW REVIEW).
3. Prior to Stubbendieck, no reported Nebraska cases involved a conviction for as-
sisting suicide. In State v. Fuller, the defendant was convicted of murder and
argued on appeal that he should have been tried under the assisting suicide stat-
ute (with its substantially lesser penalty), but the Nebraska Supreme Court ex-
plained that the assisting suicide statute was inapplicable to offenses committed
prior to January 1, 1979, including the defendant’s offense. 203 Neb. 233, 241–42,
278 N.W.2d 756, 761 (1979). However, it should be noted that the lack of convic-
tions for assisting suicide in Nebraska does not necessarily mean that assisting
suicide is rare or unusual. Police and prosecutors are generally reluctant to pur-
sue charges for assisting suicide because of the sensitive and complex issues in-
volved. See Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 369–71 (1986) (analyzing data suggesting that prosecu-
tions for assisting suicide are exceedingly rare and explaining that “[p]olice and
prosecutors appear to be reluctant to bring charges for suicide assistance”).
4. Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307, became effective
January 1, 1979. See Fuller, 203 Neb. at 241–42, 278 N.W.2d at 761 (explaining
that, because Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute became operative on January
1, 1979, it is inapplicable to any offense committed prior to that date).
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braska Revised Statutes, which reads in pertinent part: “A person
commits assisting suicide when, with intent to assist another person
in committing suicide, he aids and abets him in committing or at-
tempting to commit suicide.”5 In interpreting the statute for the first
time, the Nebraska Supreme Court clarified the legal contours of as-
sisting suicide in Nebraska but simultaneously raised new, difficult
issues that must be resolved in future criminal prosecutions.6
The bizarre and sensational facts of Stubbendieck take place
against the backdrop of national controversy in the legal status of as-
sisting suicide.7 In 2019 alone, New Jersey8 and Maine9 both legalized
physician-assisted suicide.10 Further, the highly publicized case of
Commonwealth v. Carter recently sparked controversy after the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the involuntary man-
slaughter conviction of a defendant who pressured her depressed
boyfriend, through text messages and phone calls, to kill himself.11
Accordingly, the first judicial interpretation of Nebraska’s assisting
suicide statute warrants analysis to clarify the status of assisting sui-
cide in Nebraska.12
The Stubbendieck holding establishes an overly broad standard for
assisting suicide in Nebraska.13 Under the standard established by
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stubbendieck, a defendant may en-
gage in a moderate degree of involvement in the death of the victim—
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307(1).
6. See infra Parts IV–V (discussing the legal significance of the Stubbendieck opin-
ion and unresolved legal issues).
7. For a timeline and brief overview of recent developments in physician-assisted
suicide laws across the United States, see Physician-Assisted Suicide Fast Facts,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/physician-assisted-suicide-fast-facts/
index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/KR8M-JFZJ] (last updated June 11, 2020).
8. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-1 to -20 (West 2020). Physicians in New Jersey may pre-
scribe lethal drugs to patients who meet certain criteria and have less than six
months left to live. Id.
9. ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2140 (2020). Terminally ill adults in Maine who are deemed
mentally competent and have less than six months to live may request a prescrip-
tion for life-ending medication. Id.
10. See Physician-Assisted Suicide Fast Facts, supra note 7.
11. 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020). Defendant
Michelle Carter was sentenced to fifteen months in jail, and the Supreme Court
of the United States denied her petition for writ of certiorari on January 13, 2020.
Id. The sensational facts of the Carter case provoked widespread outrage and
garnered national media attention. See, e.g., Pete Williams, Supreme Court Won’t
Hear Appeal of Michelle Carter, Convicted of Encouraging Boyfriend’s Death by




12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining that prior to Stubbendieck no
reported Nebraska cases involved a conviction for assisting suicide).
13. See infra section V.B.
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such as temporarily smothering and giving poison to the victim14—
and still only face prosecution for assisting suicide15 rather than
homicide.16 Yet, on the other end of the spectrum, a Nebraska defen-
dant may now incur criminal liability for assisting suicide by mini-
mally participating in the victim’s death; mere verbal encouragement
of suicide is sufficient to find guilt when suicide is attempted or
completed.17
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part II discusses the history and
public policy considerations for assisting suicide laws and describes
the various approaches taken to criminalize assisting suicide in juris-
dictions across the United States.18 Part III provides an overview of
the Stubbendieck opinion and the key takeaways from the court’s first
interpretation of Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute.19 Part IV exam-
ines how the Stubbendieck opinion provides useful precedent for dis-
tinguishing assisting suicide from criminal homicide in light of a
multi-jurisdictional challenge to draw distinctions between the two.20
Finally, Part V argues that the Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of “aiding and abetting,” as used in Nebraska’s assisting suicide
statute, employs far too broad of a standard and recommends prefera-
ble alternative approaches taken by courts in jurisdictions with simi-
lar statutes.21
14. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 716–18, 924 N.W.2d 711, 723 (2019)
(describing Stubbendieck’s involvement in the victim’s suicide, which included
temporarily smothering and giving poison to the victim).
15. In cases with facts similar to Stubbendieck, other jurisdictions with assisting sui-
cide statutes have also struggled to differentiate criminal homicide from extreme
cases of assisting suicide. See infra Part IV.
16. In Nebraska, a person commits murder in the first degree “if he or she kills an-
other person (1) purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or . . . (3)
by administering poison or causing the same to be done.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
303 (Reissue 2016). First degree murder is either a Class I or IA felony, while
assisting suicide is a Class IV felony. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-303, -307 (Reissue
2016).
17. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716–18, 924 N.W.2d at 723 (“[A]iding and abetting
requires some participation in a criminal act which must be evidenced by word,
act, or deed, and mere encouragement or assistance is sufficient to make one an
aider or abettor. No particular acts are necessary, however, nor is it necessary
that the defendant take physical part in the commission of the crime or that there
was an express agreement to commit the crime. Yet, evidence of mere presence,
acquiescence, or silence is not enough to sustain the State’s burden of proving
guilt under an aiding and abetting theory.” (footnotes omitted)).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV (describing the challenges courts in other jurisdictions have
faced when trying to distinguish assisting suicide from criminal homicide and
arguing that the Stubbendieck opinion helps clarify the issue).
21. See infra Part V.
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II. THE LAW OF ASSISTING SUICIDE IN CONTEXT
A. History and Approaches in Other Jurisdictions
Under English common law, suicide was a crime.22 Because suicide
was a crime, any attempt, incitement, or conspiracy to commit suicide
was a crime as well.23 Although several states once criminalized sui-
cide as a common law offense, no state ever went so far as to actually
punish an offender.24 Today, no state criminalizes suicide or the at-
tempt to commit suicide.25 This reflects the prevailing belief that sui-
cide requires psychological rather than criminal intervention.26
However, the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States, to
22. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 400 (C.B. 1562) (“[H]e who determines to kill
himself . . . . the quality of the offence is murder. . . . [i]t is an offence against
nature, against God, and against the King. Against nature, because it is contrary
to the rules of self-preservation, which is the principle of nature; for every thing
living does by instinct of nature defend itself from destruction, and then to de-
stroy one’s self is contrary to nature, and a thing most horrible. Against God, in
that it is a breach of His commandment, thou shalt not kill; and to kill himself, by
which act he kills in presumption his own soul, is a greater offence than to kill
another. Against the King in that hereby he has lost a subject, and . . . . [he who
took his own life] has offended the King, in giving such an example to his sub-
jects, and it belongs to the King, who has the government of the people, to take
care that no evil example be given them, and an evil example is an offence
against him.”); see also In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983) (discuss-
ing the crime of suicide in England); State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 855–56 (N.C.
1961) (same). English courts criminalized suicide because it was viewed as an
offense against the king, as it deprived the king of a subject. English courts also
perceived suicide as contrary to God and nature. Suicide was treated as a form of
homicide often referred to as “self-murder.” Shaffer, supra note 3, at 349–50.
23. Shaffer, supra note 3, at 349 (discussing inchoate and accomplice liability for the
crime of suicide).
24. Id. at 350; Willis, 121 S.E.2d at 854–56. In Willis, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina explained that in North Carolina, as in many states, the common law of
England is still in effect insofar as it is not “destructive of, or repugnant to, or
inconsistent with” our form of government and to the extent it has not been abro-
gated or repealed by statute or has become obsolete. Id. The court went on to
discuss that because the only punishments available for suicide under the com-
mon law have been prohibited by state constitutions or statutes, suicide essen-
tially remains a crime in name alone and offenders cannot be punished. Id. The
court could not find any previous American case that gave a punishment for the
crime of suicide.
25. Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1178 (noting that no jurisdictions in the United States
presently criminalize suicide and most jurisdictions also do not criminalize the
attempt thereof); Sean Sweeney, Note, Deadly Speech: Encouraging Suicide and
Problematic Prosecutions, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 941, 946 (2017) (“In time, soci-
ety has grown to recognize that suicide has many causes and has gradually elimi-
nated the severe legal and religious punishments attached to it.”).
26. Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1178 (“[P]unishing suicide is contrary to modern penal and
psychological theory.” (quoting VICTOR VICTOROFF, THE SUICIDAL PATIENT 173–74
(1982))).
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varying degrees and by various methods, criminalize the act of assist-
ing another to commit suicide.27
Jurisdictions in the United States take three general approaches in
criminalizing assisting suicide.28 Thirty states, including Nebraska,29
have statutes that specifically criminalize assisting suicide as a sui
generis30 offense.31 Ten states have statutes that criminalize assisting
suicide as a form of criminal homicide.32 Five states and the District of
Columbia prohibit conduct that amounts to assisting suicide under
the common law, either as a standalone offense or under a theory of
criminal homicide.33 Michigan recognizes the common law offense of
27. See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text (describing the approaches taken
by jurisdictions in the United States to criminalize assisting suicide).
28. See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. Jurisdictions in the United States
generally criminalize assisting suicide as a sui generis offense, as a form of crimi-
nal homicide, or as a sui generis offense in some circumstances and a form of
criminal homicide in other circumstances.
29. In Nebraska, assisting suicide is an independent offense from criminal homicide.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016).
30. As used herein, a sui generis crime is one which state legislatures (or state courts
in jurisdictions where criminal liability is imposed under a common law theory)
recognize as an independent offense. Assisting suicide in these jurisdictions is a
sui generis offense in that the offense of assisting suicide is a unique offense inde-
pendent from any criminal homicide laws. See Sui Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.”).
31. ALA. CODE § 22-8B-4 (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 645 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2020); IDAHO CODE § 18-4017
(2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-34.5 (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-
1-2.5 (West 2020); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.2 (West 2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5407 (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:32.12 (2020); ME. STAT. tit. 17, § 204 (2019), https://legislature.maine.gov/
statutes/17-A/title17-Asec204.html [https://perma.unl.edu/3Y6J-LW2N]; MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.329a (2020);
MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (2020); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-307 (Reissue 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-6 (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
16-04 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.04 (West 2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 813 (2020); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090
(2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216
(2020); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060
(2020); WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (2020).
32. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (2020); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-104 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2020); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 (West 2020); FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-702 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125
(2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (LexisNexis 2020).
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.329a; Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 726
A.2d 172 (D.C. 1999); Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020); State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 854–56 (N.C.
1961); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861 (Va. 1992); Lenoci v. Leonard, 21 A.3d
694 (Vt. 2011) (applying common law principles to analyze liability where defen-
dant’s conduct allegedly caused victim’s suicide); Moats v. Preston Cty. Comm’n,
521 S.E.2d 180 (W. Va. 1999) (same).
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assisting suicide in addition to its assisting suicide statute.34 Mon-
tana,35 New York,36 and Pennsylvania37 have statutes that prohibit
assisting suicide as a standalone offense under certain circumstances
and as a form of criminal homicide under other circumstances.38 The
legal status of assisting suicide is undetermined in Nevada and
Wyoming.39
In states that have statutes specifically criminalizing assisting sui-
cide as a sui generis offense,40 assisting suicide is generally a lesser-
included offense of criminal homicide.41 Nebraska law is representa-
tive of this approach.42 Alaska is illustrative of jurisdictions that de-
fine suicide assistance as a form of criminal homicide—in Alaska a
defendant who “intentionally aids another person to commit suicide”
is guilty of manslaughter.43 Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme is repre-
sentative of states that criminalize suicide assistance as a sui generis
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.329a.
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (2019). In Montana, a defendant is guilty of crimi-
nal homicide, rather than aiding or soliciting suicide, only when the victim dies
as a result of the defendant’s aid or solicitation. MONT. CODE ANN § 45-5-102
(2019).
36. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15 (McKinney 2020). In New York, a defendant is
guilty of second-degree manslaughter, rather than assisting suicide, when the
defendant “intentionally causes or aides” the victim to commit suicide.
37. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2020). In Pennsylvania, the defendant is guilty of
criminal homicide when the defendant causes the victim’s suicide by “force, du-
ress or deception.” Id.
38. Interestingly, the Model Penal Code treats “causing or aiding suicide” both as a
form of criminal homicide and as an independent offense, depending on the na-
ture of the conduct at issue:
A person may be convicted of criminal homicide for causing another to
commit suicide only if he purposely causes such suicide by force, duress
or deception . . . A person who purposely aids or solicits another to com-
mit suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes
such suicide or an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a misdemeanor.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
39. See Assisted Suicide Laws in the United States, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://
www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/assisted-suicide-state-laws/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/JW4K-KN2V] (last updated Jan. 6, 2017) (indicating the undeter-
mined status of assisting suicide in Nevada and Wyoming). Neither Nevada or
Wyoming recognize common law crimes nor do they have a statute that addresses
assisting suicide.
40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining assisting suicide as a sui
generis offense).
41. Guyora Binder & Luis Chiesa, The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide, 56 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 65, 71, 108 (2019) (discussing the status of assisting suicide as a lesser-
included offense of criminal homicide in some jurisdictions).
42. See State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 242, 278 N.W.2d 756, 761 (1979) (discussing
that criminal defendant convicted of murder may have been eligible for jury in-
struction on assisting suicide if the statute was in effect at that time).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2020); see supra note 32 and accompanying text (set-
ting forth jurisdictions where assisting suicide is criminalized as a form of crimi-
nal homicide rather than as a sui generis offense).
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offense44 under certain circumstances and as criminal homicide under
other circumstances.45 In Pennsylvania, a defendant is guilty of crimi-
nal homicide, rather than assisting suicide, when the defendant
causes the victim’s suicide by “force, duress or deception.”46
Commonwealth v. Carter47 is illustrative of the approach taken in
jurisdictions that prosecute assisting suicide under a common law the-
ory of criminal homicide.48 In Massachusetts, involuntary manslaugh-
ter is not a statutory crime but is instead defined at common law as
the unintentional killing of another person through “wanton or reck-
less” conduct that disregards probable harm to another.49 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that defendant Michelle Carter
acted wantonly and recklessly by helping her suicidal boyfriend form a
plan to kill himself and by pressuring him to follow through when he
sought to abandon the attempt.50 In jurisdictions that have no assist-
ing suicide statutes, defendants such as Carter face the full penalties
of criminal homicide laws, whereas defendants in other jurisdictions
would be punished less severely under assisting suicide laws.51
To add to the complexity of the issue, state statutes that prohibit
assisting suicide vary widely in the conduct they forbid.52 For exam-
ple, a number of states provide exceptions for healthcare providers
who provide varying degrees of assistance to competent adults who
decline life-sustaining treatment.53 The language statutes use in
44. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining assisting suicide as a sui
generis offense).
45. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2020). The other jurisdictions following this approach
are Montana and New York, although the Model Penal Code follows this ap-
proach as well. See supra notes 35–38.
46. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505.
47. 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020); see supra note 11
and accompanying text (discussing the Carter case).
48. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that criminal-
ize assisting suicide under a common law theory of criminal liability).
49. Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 569 (setting forth the standard for the common law crime of
involuntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909
(Mass. 1944) (same).
50. Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 569.
51. In jurisdictions that prohibit assisting suicide by statute, assisting suicide is gen-
erally a distinct and lesser-included offense. Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at
71, 108 (discussing the nature of assisting suicide as a lesser-included offense in
jurisdictions which criminalize assisting suicide as a sui generis offense). Had
Carter faced prosecution in a jurisdiction that deals with assisting suicide as a
standalone offense, the State almost certainly would have prosecuted her for as-
sisting suicide rather than criminal homicide. See infra Part IV (discussing the
dividing line between assisting suicide and criminal homicide in jurisdictions
that recognize both as separate offenses).
52. See supra notes 28–51 and accompanying text (discussing the different ap-
proaches states use to criminalize assisting suicide).
53. The statutory scheme in California is typical of this approach. In California, a
physician may prescribe a lethal drug for a patient to self-administer if the pa-
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describing criminal assistive conduct include “assisting,”54 “caus-
ing,”55 “encouraging,”56 “advising,”57 “aiding,”58 and, in the case of
Nebraska, “aiding and abetting” suicide.59 As a result, whether a de-
fendant’s conduct amounts to criminal suicide assistance depends
greatly on the jurisdiction in question.60
B. Public Policy Considerations
The predominant policy rationale for assisting suicide laws is that
the State’s interest in preserving life is greater than an individual’s
desire for death, especially when such an individual is otherwise
healthy.61 Assisting suicide laws also serve several subordinate pur-
tient is competent and terminally ill. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1 (Deer-
ing 2020). California’s assisting suicide statute specifically excludes prosecution
against such a physician. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 2020). Although not
currently legal in Nebraska, activists have made notable attempts to legalize
physician-assisted suicide in the state. As early as 1937, State Senator John H.
Stock introduced legislation to legalize “euthanasia,” but the bill never went to a
vote. Nebraska, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/
nebraska/ [https://perma.unl.edu/QVP7-38YK] (last viewed Aug. 14, 2020). Legis-
lators also introduced physician-assisted suicide bills in 1996 (LB 1259), 1997
(LB 406), and 1999 (LB 70). Id. On January 17, 2017, Nebraska State Senator
Ernie Chambers introduced the Patient Choice at End of Life Act (LB 450) to
implement physician-assisted suicide in Nebraska, but the legislation failed to
advance. Because Stubbendieck does not deal with assisting suicide in the context
of physician-assisted suicide, this Note addresses assisting suicide law broadly
and does not take up specific issues of physician-assisted suicide.
54. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2019) (“Whoever intentionally . . . assists an-
other in taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.”).
55. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2020) (“A person is guilty of manslaughter
in the second degree when: . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids another person to
commit suicide.”).
56. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (“Whoever intentionally . . . encourages . . . an-
other in taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.”).
57. See, e.g., id. (“Whoever intentionally advises . . . another in taking the other’s own
life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment
of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.”).
58. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (“A person is guilty of manslaughter in the
second degree when: . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids another person to com-
mit suicide.”).
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016) (“A person commits assisting suicide
when, with intent to assist another person in committing suicide, he aids and
abets him in committing or attempting to commit suicide.”).
60. See infra Part IV (describing conduct that qualifies as assisting suicide in some
jurisdictions but qualifies as criminal homicide in other jurisdictions). For a
broader discussion on the importance of rhetorical choices in legal discourse, see
Baue, supra note 2.
61. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (“[A] State may
properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular
individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preserva-
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poses.62 They attempt to prevent potential defendants from encourag-
ing a victim to commit suicide in order to advance the defendant’s own
interests.63 They also address the inadequacies of homicide laws, aim-
ing to penalize defendants who wrongfully participate in the death of
a consenting victim but who might not fulfill the required elements for
criminal homicide.64
These laws are justified from the utilitarian point of view—suicide
is a tragedy and major public health problem, and the State is justi-
fied in punishing those who help bring about the victim’s death.65 The
suicidal individual’s judgment is often distorted by an irrational focus
on present suffering.66 Suicidal persons also generally underestimate
their capacity to recover from negative life events and do not appreci-
ate the negative effects their deaths will have on others in their lives
and society as a whole.67 Thus, while it may be counterproductive to
tion of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests
of the individual.”); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 817 (9th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that terminally ill individuals’ liberty interests in control-
ling the time and manner of death outweighed the State’s “unqualified interest in
preserving life”), rev’d, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1181
(Cal. 1983) (discussing that a rationale underlying assisting suicide statutes is
the State interest in the sanctity of life); see also Konstantin Tretyakov, The
Right to Die in the United States, Canada, and China: Legal Fictions and Their
Utility in a Comparative Perspective, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 79, 82 (2018)
(finding that states were willing to recognize a patient’s right to withdraw life-
saving treatment if the quality of the patient’s life was considered too low); Shaf-
fer, supra note 3, at 354 (“[T]he state interest in preserving life overrides an indi-
vidual’s preference for death.”).
62. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing the subordinate pur-
poses of assisting suicide statutes).
63. See Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1181 (discussing that assisting suicide statutes at-
tempt to discourage individuals from promoting suicide to advance their own per-
sonal interests).
64. See id.
65. Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at 68. Under utilitarian theory, the government
has “a collective responsibility to serve the general welfare,” and “criminal pun-
ishment [is] a social cost worth bearing in so far as it deters conduct expected to
be even more socially costly.” Id. Binder and Chiesa also argue that from a utili-
tarian perspective, assisting suicide is worthy of criminalization because suicide
is a serious public health problem. Id.
66. Id. (“Those who commit suicide may do so to alleviate current misery, but there
are several reasons to expect that this decision will often be short-sighted. First,
misery, and pessimism about interventions to alleviate it, can be co-occurring
symptoms of depression. Second, cognitive psychology has established present-
bias as a common cognitive error in evaluating choices.” (footnotes omitted)).
67. Id. (“[C]ognitive psychology has shown that we are more resilient than we sup-
pose: where unhappiness is caused by a catastrophic event like a disabling acci-
dent, it is often surprisingly ephemeral, as we adjust our expectations to our
circumstances. Not only may individuals underestimate their own welfare loss
from suicide in these ways, they may also undervalue the welfare loss to others
who will grieve, or be deprived of their productive contributions.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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punish individuals in need of psychological help for attempting or
committing suicide,68 no such reasoning prevents the State from pun-
ishing those who, fully capable of assessing the suicidal individual’s
decision, assist or encourage suicide.69
The rationale for punishing the assisting defendant and not the
victim can be understood through comparison to the punishment of an
accessory to a crime where the principal’s conduct is excused, for ex-
ample, by reason of insanity.70 Like a principal laboring under a con-
dition of insanity, the suicide victim’s suicidal conduct is wrongful, but
excused.71 An accomplice, however, would not benefit from the excuse
and remains guilty.72 A defendant who furnishes a gun to a suicidal
victim intending that the victim take his or her life should be no less
liable than an accessory who furnishes a gun to an insane individual
intending that he or she kill someone else.73
Critics argue that assisting suicide laws impinge on the autonomy
and freedom of competent adults to make the deeply personal choice
as to whether to live or die.74 Advocates of an individual’s “right to
die” charge that the State should not punish people for aiding a com-
petent adult to take his or her own life unless the defendant has done
68. Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1178 (discussing the modern view that suicidal individuals
require psychological, rather than legal intervention, and that punishment of sui-
cide is contrary to modern penal and psychological theory).
69. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (discussing the justifications for
punishing the criminal assistant, but not the victim, in assisting suicide cases).
70. Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at 83 (elaborating on the view that an assisting
suicide defendant is treated as an accessory to wrongful but excused conduct by
the principal).
71. Id. (explaining that the excuse of the victim’s conduct “would not extend to those
who aid or encourage the suicide, given that they could typically be deterred by
the criminal sanction and punishing them for contributing to the death of an-
other would not be manifestly cruel”).
72. Where a defense is classified as a justification, the conduct at issue is not wrong-
ful. Thus, an accomplice to a justified act does not incur criminal liability. How-
ever, where the defense is classified as an excuse (such as the insanity defense),
the underlying conduct remains wrongful and the excuse only benefits the defen-
dant laboring under the excusing condition. As such, an accomplice to a crime
where the principal is excused is not discharged of criminal liability. See United
States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing criminal
theory underlying defenses classified as excuse defenses).
73. Comparing, in this way, the crime of assisting suicide to the crime of aiding and
abetting presents problems and played a central role in the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Stubbendieck. See infra Part V.
74. See, e.g., Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at 69 (discussing that punishing the
encouragement of suicide is unappealing from a libertarian perspective because
doing so restricts fundamental personal freedoms); Tretyakov, supra note 61, at
83 (analyzing judicial and political arguments in the context of physician-assisted
suicide that an individual’s “right to die” is supported by “the common law doc-
trines of self-determination, bodily integrity, and informed consent, and the con-
stitutional law doctrine of the right to privacy”).
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something to interfere with the suicidal individual’s autonomy.75 As
social trends and movements, like the so-called “right to die” move-
ment, continue to place an increasing value on individual autonomy,
utilitarian justifications for assisting suicide laws may struggle to
withstand the scrutiny of arguments for respecting bodily autonomy
and personal freedoms.76
III. THE STUBBENDIECK OPINION
The Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed Nebraska’s assisting sui-
cide statute77 for the first time in State v. Stubbendieck.78 The defen-
dant, Matthew Stubbendieck (Stubbendieck), and the victim, Alicia
Wilemon-Sullivan (Sullivan), were in a long-distance romantic rela-
tionship maintained predominantly over text message.79 Stub-
bendieck lived in Cass County, Nebraska, and Sullivan lived in
Jacksonville, Florida.80 Sullivan told Stubbendieck that she was suf-
fering from an aggressive form of cancer, had given up on treatment,
and wanted to die.81 Over several weeks, the two formed a plan for
Sullivan to fly to Nebraska, marry Stubbendieck, and kill herself.82
Stubbendieck obtained a plane ticket for Sullivan and searched for
drugs he could use to help Sullivan commit suicide.83 A witness testi-
75. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing physician-assisted suicide
laws). This is precisely the issue addressed by several assisting suicide statutes
that punish more harshly or only punish conduct that interferes with the victim’s
autonomy and judgment. For example, in Pennsylvania, the defendant is guilty of
criminal homicide when the defendant causes the victim’s suicide by force, du-
ress, or deception. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2020).
76. Marvin Zalman, John Strate, Denis Hunter & James Sellars, Michigan’s Assisted
Suicide Three Ring Circus—An Intersection of Law and Politics, 23 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 863, 908 (1997) (noting that social trends favoring personal autonomy, such
as the so-called “right to die” movement, continue to gain traction in mainstream
society).
77. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016).
78. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 924 N.W.2d 711 (2019). See supra note 3
and accompanying text (explaining that the Stubbendieck case was the first in
Nebraska state history to adjudicate a conviction for assisting suicide).
79. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 704–05, 924 N.W.2d at 716.
80. Id.
81. Id. (“During the course of the investigation, Stubbendieck told investigators that
he believed Sullivan was suffering from ‘Stage IV cancer.’ Stubbendieck indicated
that Sullivan ‘hated’ hospitals, but had been convinced by friends to undergo ra-
diation treatments in Jacksonville, Florida. According to Stubbendieck, Sullivan
terminated radiation therapy after only 5 weeks because her condition had not
improved.”).
82. Id. Over the course of the couple’s lengthy text message conversations, Sullivan
repeatedly threatened to harm herself and claimed to be in great pain. The two
established a plan to get married in Nebraska, after which Sullivan would “go out
in [Stubbendieck’s] arms as [his] wife.” Id. (alternation in original).
83. Id. Notably, the airline ticket Stubbendieck purchased for Sullivan was a one-
way ticket. Id.
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fied that Stubbendieck suggested he obtained liquid morphine for Sul-
livan, and another witness testified that Stubbendieck said he
planned to inject Sullivan with morphine to “put her to sleep.”84
Sullivan arrived in Nebraska on July 31, 2017.85 The next day,
witnesses saw Sullivan taking pills before Stubbendieck took her to a
lake outside of Weeping Water, Nebraska.86 Stubbendieck told au-
thorities that Sullivan began cutting her wrists with a knife at the
lake, and that he suffocated Sullivan at least twice to help her kill
herself; however, he claimed that he ultimately did not suffocate her
to death and left the area while she was still alive and talking to
him.87 On August 5, 2017, Stubbendieck reported Sullivan’s death
and led local law enforcement to her body.88
Due to the stage of decomposition of the body, an autopsy was una-
ble to determine a cause of death.89 However, the autopsy revealed no
signs of injury (other than the cuts on her wrist), and, in a bizarre
twist, there were no signs of illness, including cancer.90 Sullivan did
have, however, a level of morphine in her system that was within the
range of some overdose cases.91 The pathologist who performed the
autopsy determined that drugs, asphyxiation, and hypothermia could
not be excluded as contributing factors.92 After obtaining witness in-
terviews, autopsy results, and Stubbendieck’s text messages, authori-
84. Id. at 705–06, 924 N.W.2d at 716.
85. Id. at 706, 924 N.W.2d at 717.
86. Id.
87. Id. (“Stubbendieck indicated that the two remained in the remote area for ap-
proximately 8 hours. Stubbendieck admitted that during that time, on two occa-
sions, he attempted to assist Sullivan by covering her nose and mouth in order to
suffocate her. Stubbendieck told investigators that Sullivan was alive and con-
versing with him when he left her 7 1/2 hours after arriving at the location.”).
88. Id. at 704, 924 N.W.2d at 716.
89. Id. at 707–08, 924 N.W.2d at 717–18.
90. Id. at 707, 924 N.W.2d at 717.
91. Id. This, coupled with the fact that there was evidence suggesting Stubbendieck
had sought and obtained the morphine for Sullivan (and potentially even directly
administered the morphine by injecting Sullivan) for the purpose of killing her,
was particularly damning for Stubbendieck. As discussed infra Part IV, most ju-
risdictions in the United States are in broad agreement that furnishing the
means of suicide (e.g., the poison, gun, knife, etc.) to the victim constitutes assist-
ing suicide.
92. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 707, 924 N.W.2d at 717. The defense seized on evi-
dence suggesting Sullivan was addicted to narcotics in an apparent attempt to
cast reasonable doubt as to whether her death was a suicide at all, especially
considering the autopsy could not determine a cause of death. Paul Hammel, Co-
Workers of Man Accused in Assisted-Suicide Case Say They Told Him His Plan
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ties charged Stubbendieck with assisting suicide.93 Stubbendieck was
found guilty and sentenced to probation.94
Stubbendieck appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, arguing
there was insufficient evidence to support conviction and that the trial
court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, includ-
ing some of Stubbendieck’s text messages and the forensic patholo-
gist’s autopsy results and testimony.95 The court held that, although
the autopsy could not determine a cause of death, the autopsy results
and associated testimony were not irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial
because they were crucial to determining whether Sullivan had actu-
ally killed herself and to what degree Stubbendieck had partici-
pated.96 Similarly, the court held that Stubbendieck’s text message
exchanges were not irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial because they
contained information relevant to Stubbendieck’s motive and involve-
ment in Sullivan’s death.97
The Stubbendieck opinion provided guidance for the first time on
how Nebraska courts should analyze sufficiency of evidence in assist-
ing suicide cases.98 Unsurprisingly, the court relied on Nebraska aid-
ing and abetting jurisprudence in interpreting Nebraska’s assisting
suicide statute.99 The court noted that aiding and abetting is not a
crime in its own right but, instead, is a theory for finding criminal
liability for an underlying crime.100 As interpreted by the Stub-
bendieck court, a defendant satisfies the aiding and abetting require-
ment of Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute101 by participating
physically or verbally in the commission or attempted commission of a
93. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 706, 924 N.W.2d at 717.
94. Id. at 707, 924 N.W.2d at 717.
95. Id. The fact that the autopsy was unable to determine a decisive cause of death
was critical for Stubbendieck’s argument on appeal. Stubbendieck argued that
the “corpus delicti” of the crime of assisting suicide could not be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt if it was unclear whether a suicide had in fact occurred. Id. at
718, 924 N.W.2d at 723–24.
96. Id. at 709–12, 924 N.W.2d at 719–20 (“[The pathologist’s] testimony was relevant
to the extent that it provided the trier of fact with evidence that the injuries
sustained and drugs ingested were in furtherance of a successful attempt at sui-
cide and not the result of natural causes. The fact that Sullivan’s body was found
to have a lethal amount of morphine cannot be discounted, especially as it relates
to the testimonial evidence regarding Stubbendieck’s attempts to acquire mor-
phine in furtherance of Sullivan’s plan, an affirmative act which constitutes aid-
ing or abetting under § 28-307.”).
97. Id. at 715–16, 924 N.W.2d at 722.
98. See infra notes 99–106 (discussing sufficiency of evidence in the Stubbendieck
case).
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016); Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716, 924
N.W.2d at 723.
100. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716, 924 N.W.2d at 722.
101. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307.
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suicide, including “mere encouragement” of the victim’s suicide.102
The court did not require any specific conduct, an agreement to com-
mit suicide, or that the defendant physically participate in the sui-
cide.103 However, the court did require that the State prove the
defendant’s participation beyond “mere presence, acquiescence, or
silence.”104
Applying this standard, the court determined that Stubbendieck
(1) encouraged Sullivan to commit suicide by texting her to come to
Nebraska and kill herself, and (2) participated in the suicide by
searching for and “ostensibly” acquiring morphine as well as tempora-
rily suffocating Sullivan.105 Finally, the court determined that Stub-
bendieck’s own admissions combined with the corroborative evidence
of the text messages, witness testimony, and autopsy results proved
the corpus delicti of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.106
IV. DISTINGUISHING ASSISTING SUICIDE FROM HOMICIDE
The facts of the Stubbendieck case straddle the thin line between
assisting suicide and homicide that jurisdictions across the United
States have struggled to characterize.107 Stubbendieck’s conduct
comes close to fulfilling the elements of murder while still being more
appropriately characterized as assisting suicide.108 While the court’s
102. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716, 924 N.W.2d at 722–23. The precedent set by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in concluding that “mere encouragement” of a victim’s
suicide is sufficient to commit assisting suicide is problematic. See infra Part V
(discussing the problems and alternative solutions to the standard of “mere
encouragement”).
103. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716–17, 924 N.W.2d at 723. By not requiring any spe-
cific conduct to find a defendant guilty of assisting suicide, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court aligned Nebraska with the majority of American jurisdictions,
which do not require any specific conduct to find a defendant guilty of assisting
suicide. See infra Part IV (discussing approaches taken in other jurisdictions with
regard to assisting suicide).
104. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723. Indeed, a defendant’s mere
presence, acquiescence, or silence with regard to a victim’s suicide would be insuf-
ficient to find a defendant guilty of assisting suicide in any jurisdiction in the
United States. See infra Parts IV–V (discussing approaches taken in other juris-
dictions with regard to assisting suicide).
105. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723.
106. Id. at 718–19, 924 N.W.2d at 724.
107. See infra notes 131–37 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties that
many jurisdictions have encountered in drawing distinctions between assisting
suicide and criminal homicide).
108. Importantly, Stubbendieck admitted to temporarily smothering the victim, and
the trial court found that Stubbendieck ostensibly obtained morphine and fur-
nished it to the victim with the intent that she used the drugs to kill herself.
Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723; see also People v. Cleaves, 280
Cal. Rptr. 146, 148–49 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding defendant guilty of homicide
where defendant held victim’s body in place while victim strangled himself);
State v. Sexson, 869 P.2d 301, 305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (finding defendant guilty
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opinion does not discuss the issue, it was a focal point at oral argu-
ment.109 Chief Justice Heavican and Justice Stacy questioned
Kimberly Klein, counsel for the State, on why (and indeed, if) Stub-
bendieck’s conduct constituted assisting suicide rather than criminal
homicide.110 Klein responded with:
[T]he line between the two can be drawn rather finely. If the defendant had
taken an act which essentially directly contributed to the death of the victim,
then you would be dealing with homicide. If he does something to aid and
abet?—and that’s what really distinguishes this from a homicide?—to aid and
abet her in suicide, then he would be guilty of the Class IV felony of assisting
suicide rather than the Class I felony of first-degree murder.111
The State’s reasoning on this critical issue warrants analysis, as it is
illustrative of the consistent struggle to distinguish cases of assisting
suicide from criminal homicide in jurisdictions that have criminalized
assisting suicide.112
A. The Spectrum of Assistive Conduct
In describing conduct that “essentially” and “directly” contributes
to the victim’s death,113 the State highlights the importance of proxi-
mate causation114 in distinguishing murder from assisting suicide.115
This approach is characteristic of the dominant trend in other jurisdic-
of homicide where defendant held rifle aimed at victim while victim pulled the
trigger); People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding defen-
dant guilty of homicide where defendant held knife in place and positioned knife
to deal maximum damage while victim repeatedly thrust himself on knife). The
defendant’s conduct in each of these cases arguably involves less active participa-
tion in the victim’s death than Stubbendieck’s participation in Sullivan’s death,
yet Stubbendieck was only charged with and convicted of assisting suicide,
whereas the defendants in each of these cases were convicted of homicide.
109. Oral Argument, Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 924 N.W.2d 711 (No. S-18-600),
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/video-arguments-02-28-2019.
110. Id. at 42:09–43:00.
111. Id. Interestingly, Klein’s response here is characteristic of the dominant trend in
other jurisdictions in which courts conduct fact-specific inquiries on a case-by-
case basis to determine how “direct,” “overt,” “foreseeable,” “active,” or “affirma-
tive” the conduct in question is. See infra notes 113–21 (discussing the case-by-
case inquiry typical of other jurisdictions).
112. See infra notes 131–37 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties that
many jurisdictions have encountered in drawing distinctions between assisting
suicide and criminal homicide).
113. Oral Argument, supra note 109 at 42:09–43:00.
114. In Nebraska, criminal conduct is the proximate cause of a given harm when (1)
“the injury would not have occurred” without the conduct, (2) that conduct is the
“natural and probable” cause of that harm, and (3) “there was no efficient inter-
vening cause.” State v. Irish, 292 Neb. 513, 521, 873 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2016).
115. Generally, all crimes require an actus reus, a mens rea, and, where the crime
involves a prohibited result rather than prohibited conduct (where the crime is a
so-called “result crime”), causation of an injury to the legal interest protected by
the criminal law. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 133 (7th ed. 2016).
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tions in which courts conduct fact-specific inquiries to determine how
“direct,”116 “overt,”117 “foreseeable,”118 “active,”119 or “affirmative”120
the conduct in question is.121
These cases typically operate on a continuum—the more actively
the defendant participates in the act causing the death of the victim,
the closer in time the defendant’s conduct is to the victim’s death, and
where the death of the victim is a more direct and foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant’s actions, the more likely the court is to char-
acterize the defendant’s conduct as criminal homicide as opposed to
assisting suicide.122 For example, where a defendant kills a com-
116. People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442–43 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (applying the standard
that homicide is appropriate where the defendant’s participation in the death of
the victim was “active” and “direct”).
117. State v. Bouse, 264 P.2d 800, 812 (Or. 1953) (concluding that the defendant was
guilty of homicide because of his assistance in the “overt act” ultimately causing
death), overruled on different grounds by State v. Fischer, 376 P.2d 418 (1962).
118. People v. Duffy, 595 N.E.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. 1992) (finding defendant guilty of
murder where the victim’s death was a “foreseeable” consequence of defendant’s
conduct of giving a drunk and suicidal victim a loaded gun).
119. In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Cal. 1983) (“[T]he key to distinguishing
between the crimes of murder and of assisting suicide is the active or passive role
of the defendant in the suicide.”).
120. Shaffer, supra note 3, at 348 (“If an assistant participates affirmatively in the
suicide, for instance by pulling the trigger or administering a fatal dose of drugs,
courts agree that the appropriate charge is murder.”).
121. For explanations of this fact-specific analysis, see, e.g., People v. Matlock, 336
P.2d 505, 511 (Cal. 1959); In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 633 (Ct. App.
2001); People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148–49 (Ct. App. 1991); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986); Fister ex rel. Estate of
Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 194, 201 (Md. 2001); People v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d 714, 738–39 (Mich. 1994); State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 241, 278
N.W.2d 756, 761 (1979); State v. Sexson, 869 P.2d 301, 305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994);
Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at 116.
122. See, e.g., Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1180 (“[T]he key to distinguishing between the
crimes of murder and of assisting suicide is the active or passive role of the defen-
dant in the suicide.”); Matlock, 336 P.2d at 508, 511 (finding defendant guilty of
murder where defendant allegedly strangled the victim at the victim’s request);
Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 148–49 (finding defendant guilty of murder where de-
fendant held victim in place while victim strangled himself); Fuller, 203 Neb. at
241, 278 N.W.2d at 761 (holding defendant guilty of murder when defendant di-
rectly administered fatal air bubble into victim’s bloodstream directly before the
victim’s death); Duffy, 595 N.E.2d at 816 (finding defendant guilty of murder
where the victim’s death was a “foreseeable” consequence of defendant’s conduct
of giving drunk and suicidal victim a loaded gun); People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d
440, 442–43 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (applying the standard that homicide is appropriate
where the defendant’s participation in the death of the victim was “active” and
“direct”); Bouse, 264 P.2d at 812 (“[T]he [assisting suicide] statute does not con-
template active participation by one in the overt act directly causing death. It
contemplates some participation in the events leading up to the commission of
the final overt act, such as furnishing the means for bringing about death,—the
gun, the knife, the poison, or providing the water, for the use of the person who
himself commits the act of self-murder. But where a person actually performs, or
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pletely passive victim at the victim’s request, a court in any jurisdic-
tion would easily characterize the defendant’s conduct as murder, at
the extreme “homicide” end of the spectrum.123
Even before Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute was in effect, the
Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the principle that a victim’s con-
sent, and even participation, in the act causing death does not trans-
form a homicide into a suicide.124 In State v. Fuller, the victim held
out his arm while, at the victim’s request, the defendant injected a
lethal air bubble into the victim’s bloodstream.125 The Nebraska Su-
preme Court reversed Fuller’s murder conviction on other grounds but
recognized that the victim’s consent did not change the fact that
Fuller’s alleged conduct amounted to murder.126
On the other end of the spectrum, courts are generally more likely
to characterize a defendant’s conduct as assisting suicide as opposed
to homicide when the defendant’s conduct is more passive, occurs
before the victim’s death or as part of a larger chain of events leading
up to the victim’s death, and where the death of the victim is a more
indirect and unforeseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.127
American jurisdictions are in broad agreement that a defendant
merely furnishing the means of suicide to the victim (e.g., gun, knife,
actively assists in performing, the overt act resulting in death, such as shooting
or stabbing the victim, administering the poison, or holding one under water un-
til death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes murder, and it is wholly
immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an agreement with the
victim, such as a mutual suicide pact.”); Shaffer, supra note 3, at 348.
123. This is essentially what happened in the Nebraska case of State v. Fuller, where
the defendant was found guilty of murder rather than assisting suicide for di-
rectly administering a fatal air bubble into the victim’s bloodstream at the vic-
tim’s request. Fuller, 203 Neb. at 241, 278 N.W.2d at 761; see also Matlock, 336
P.2d at 508, 511 (involving defendant actively killing passive victim at victim’s
request); Bouse, 264 P.2d at 812 (same).
124. Fuller, 203 Neb. at 241, 278 N.W.2d at 761.
125. Id. at 234, 278 N.W.2d at 758.
126. Id. at 234, 241, 278 N.W.2d at 758, 761. Fuller’s conviction was reversed on Fifth
Amendment grounds.
127. See, e.g., Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1180 (discussing that defendant’s conduct must
have a direct causal link to victim’s death to constitute homicide); Cleaves, 280
Cal. Rptr. at 150–51 (explaining that the appropriate charge is assisting suicide
where the defendant’s participation in the victim’s death is “passive”); People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 738–39 (Mich. 1994) (holding that assisting suicide,
rather than murder, was the appropriate charge where defendant inserted a nee-
dle that was attached to a device equipped with lethal drugs into the arm of the
suicidal victim and instructed the victim on how to operate the device in order to
cause death); Duffy, 595 N.E.2d at 816 (concluding that the foreseeability of the
victim’s death was a critical factor in whether defendant’s conduct amounted to
assisting suicide or homicide); Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (holding the directness
of the defendant’s participation in the victim’s death to be critical in whether
defendant’s conduct amounted to homicide); Shaffer, supra note 3, at 351 n.28
(noting that “active involvement that directly results in the death of a suicidal
person” is considered murder).
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poison) constitutes assisting suicide.128 Verbal conduct that amounts
to advising or encouraging a victim to commit suicide would fall on the
extreme “assisting suicide” end of the spectrum.129
Of course, the most important issue in the present discussion is not
what conduct can clearly be characterized as either assisting suicide
or homicide, but rather, the characterization of conduct that falls in
the gray area between the two crimes.130 Courts in jurisdictions that
recognize the crime of assisting suicide have found the following con-
duct to constitute criminal homicide: holding a knife in place and posi-
tioning the knife to inflict maximum damage while the victim
repeatedly thrust himself on it;131 holding a rifle aimed at the victim
while the victim pulled the trigger;132 giving an intoxicated and sui-
cidal victim a rifle and ammunition and encouraging the victim to kill
himself;133 and tying up the victim and holding the victim’s body in
place so he could successfully strangle himself.134 Conversely, courts
have deemed the following conduct assisting suicide: driving off of a
cliff in furtherance of a suicide pact formed by the driver-defendant
and passenger-victim, resulting in the death of only the passenger;135
aiming a shotgun at the victim while the victim pulled the trigger;136
and inserting a needle, attached to a device equipped with lethal
128. See, e.g., Joseph G., 667 P.2d at 1180 (“If the defendant merely furnishes the
means, he is guilty of aiding a suicide; if he actively participates in the death of
the suicide victim, he is guilty of murder.”); Matlock, 336 P.2d at 51; In re Ryan
N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632 (Ct. App. 2001); Fister ex rel. Estate of Fister v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 194, 201 n.8 (Md. 2001); Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at
738–39 (“Where a defendant merely is involved in the events leading up to the
death, such as providing the means, the proper charge is assisting in a suicide.”);
State v. Sexson, 869 P.2d 301, 305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Bouse, 264 P.2d at 812
(“[Assisting suicide] contemplates some participation in the events leading up to
the commission of the final overt act, such as furnishing the means for bringing
about death,—the gun, the knife, the poison, or providing the water, for the use of
the person who himself commits the act of self-murder.”); Binder & Chiesa, supra
note 41, at 116; Shaffer, supra note 3, at 360 (“Providing the means of suicide
appears to be the act against which the assistance statutes are primarily
directed.”).
129. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2020); Williams v. State, 53 So. 3d 734,
745–46 (Miss. 2010); State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 716, 924 N.W.2d 711,
723 (2019).
130. See infra notes 131–37 and accompanying text (providing examples of conduct
that falls in the gray area between assisting suicide and criminal homicide).
131. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
132. Sexson, 869 P.2d at 303. Ironically, a Maryland court (in a hypothetical) ex-
plained that it would have found this exact same conduct to constitute assisting
suicide rather than homicide. Fister, 783 A.2d at 201 n.8.
133. People v. Duffy, 595 N.E.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. 1992).
134. People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148–49 (Ct. App. 1991).
135. In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1183 (Cal. 1983).
136. Fister, 783 A.2d at 201 n.8 (hypothetical). Ironically, a New Mexico court found
this very same conduct to constitute homicide rather than assisting suicide. Sex-
son, 869 P.2d at 303.
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drugs, into the arm of the suicidal victim and instructing the victim
how to operate the device in order to cause death.137
B. Analysis of Stubbendieck’s Conduct
In light of the above distinctions between homicide and assisting
suicide, a murder charge against Stubbendieck was unlikely without
clear evidence that Sullivan died of asphyxiation or morphine over-
dose and that Stubbendieck had personally administered the mor-
phine.138 The forensic pathologist who performed the victim’s autopsy
was unable to determine whether the victim died from morphine over-
dose, the cuts on her arms, hypothermia, Stubbendieck’s smothering
of her, or a combination of the four.139 The State likely did not bring
murder charges against Stubbendieck precisely because it was impos-
sible to determine if Stubbendieck directly or actively participated in
the victim’s death when the victim’s specific cause of death could not
be determined.140
Because Stubbendieck admitted to smothering the victim, at least
temporarily,141 there is little doubt that he would have been charged
with (and likely convicted of) murder if the victim’s autopsy revealed
the cause of death to be asphyxiation.142 Similarly, the State likely
would have charged Stubbendieck with murder if the victim’s autopsy
revealed the cause of death to be morphine overdose and there was
stronger evidence that Stubbendieck himself administered the
137. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 734 (Mich. 1994). Of course, the criminal
defendant in this case is the infamous Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who controversially
assisted numerous medical patients in ending their lives. See Keith Schneider,
Dr. Jack Kevorkian Dies at 83; A Doctor Who Helped End Lives, N.Y. TIMES (June
3, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/H2ET-4ZYC] (discussing the controversial legacy of Jack
Kevorkian).
138. See People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 511 (Cal. 1959) (holding defendant guilty of
murder, rather than assisting suicide, when defendant allegedly strangled victim
at victim’s request); Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 734 (determining that the proper
charge was assisting suicide rather than murder because defendant physician
merely provided lethal drugs to the victim rather than personally administering
the drugs); Shaffer, supra note 3, at 348 (“If an assistant participates affirma-
tively in the suicide, for instance by pulling the trigger or administering a fatal
dose of drugs, courts agree that the appropriate charge is murder.”).
139. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 707, 924 N.W.2d 711, 717 (2019).
140. Direct and active participation in the death of the victim is the critical finding
required for the charge of murder as opposed to assisting suicide. See supra notes
116–22 and accompanying text.
141. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 704–07, 924 N.W.2d at 716–17.
142. See Matlock, 336 P.2d at 511 (holding defendant guilty of murder, rather than
assisting suicide, when defendant allegedly strangled victim at victim’s request);
People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148–49 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding defendant
guilty of murder where defendant held victim in place while victim strangled
himself).
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drug.143 Indeed, such a scenario is virtually indistinguishable from
cases such as Fuller, where the defendant actively killed a consenting
victim.144 In reality, the evidence suggested Stubbendieck obtained
and furnished morphine to the victim with the intent to assist the vic-
tim in committing suicide.145 However, there was no evidence that he
personally administered the drug other than his vaguely worded prior
texts implying he would inject Sullivan with the drug.146 As discussed
above, merely furnishing the victim with the means of suicide is
nearly universally regarded as assisting suicide rather than
homicide.147
Stubbendieck presents two noteworthy precedents for distinguish-
ing assisting suicide from homicide.148 First, the Nebraska Supreme
Court signaled that it is willing to regard a relatively high degree of
direct, active assistance by the defendant in the death of the victim as
assisting suicide rather than homicide.149 Second, the court aligned
Nebraska with the vast majority of jurisdictions in recognizing that a
defendant furnishing the means of suicide to the victim constitutes
assisting suicide rather than homicide.150 As such, Stubbendieck will
undoubtedly be useful precedent for distinguishing criminal homicide
from assisting suicide in future criminal prosecutions.151 However,
Stubbendieck has also created an overly broad standard for aiding and
abetting suicide, the problems of which this Note now addresses.152
143. See Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 734 (determining that the proper charge was as-
sisting suicide rather than murder because defendant merely provided lethal
drugs to the victim rather than personally administering the drugs); Shaffer,
supra note 3, at 348 (“If an assistant participates affirmatively in the suicide, for
instance by pulling the trigger or administering a fatal dose of drugs, courts
agree that the appropriate charge is murder.”).
144. State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 241, 278 N.W.2d 756, 761 (1979); see also Matlock,
336 P.2d at 508, 511 (involving defendant actively killing passive victim at vic-
tim’s request); Bouse, 264 P.2d at 812 (same).
145. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723.
146. One of Stubbendieck’s coworkers testified that Stubbendieck had said he planned
to “ ‘[s]hoot her [Sullivan] up with morphine’ in order to ‘put her to sleep.’” Id. at
705–06, 924 N.W.2d at 716 (alteration in original).
147. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
148. See supra section IV.A (discussing how courts differentiate assisting suicide from
homicide).
149. Importantly, Stubbendieck admitted to temporarily smothering the victim, and
the trial court found that Stubbendieck ostensibly obtained morphine and fur-
nished it to the victim with the intent that she use the drugs to kill herself. Stub-
bendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723.
150. Id.; see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
151. In particular, future courts may look to Stubbendieck in determining the extent
to which a defendant may participate in the victim’s death without incurring lia-
bility for criminal homicide.
152. See infra Part V (discussing the problems created by the standard for assisting
suicide established in Stubbendieck).
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V. THE STANDARD OF AIDING AND ABETTING
The standard for aiding and abetting suicide established by the
Stubbendieck court is broad, vague, and encompasses conduct that
should be beyond the scope of Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute.153
The court’s application of common law aiding and abetting theory to
the statute is problematic because existing aiding and abetting juris-
prudence is not appropriate for the crime of assisting suicide,154 and
the standard of “mere encouragement” is overly broad.155 Instead, the
court should have applied a tempered approach similar to approaches
used by other jurisdictions.156
A. Aiding and Abetting Jurisprudence Is Inappropriate
Even though the language of Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute
specifically refers to “aiding and abetting,”157 the application of com-
mon law aiding and abetting principles to the crime of assisting sui-
cide is inappropriate. In Nebraska, aiding and abetting is not a
separate crime; instead, it is a theory for finding the defendant liable
for an underlying crime.158 Under Nebraska’s aiding and abetting
statute, “[a] person who aids, abets, procures, or causes another to
commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
principal offender.”159 However, suicide is not a crime in Nebraska.160
The Stubbendieck court itself notes that “aiding and abetting requires
some participation in a criminal act.”161 This makes the crime of aid-
ing and abetting suicide a puzzling contradiction in terms.162 The Ne-
braska Legislature failed to clarify this contradiction as it did not
153. The Stubbendieck standard criminalizes conduct that intuitively does not amount
to felony criminal conduct. Minimal assistance, such as mere encouragement of
suicide, is generally too far removed from a victim’s death and the policies behind
assisting suicide statutes to justify punishment. See infra section V.B (arguing
that the Stubbendieck standard is overly broad).
154. See infra section V.A (arguing that the application of common law aiding and
abetting principles to the crime of assisting suicide is inappropriate).
155. See infra section V.B (arguing that the Stubbendieck standard is overly broad).
156. See infra section V.C (providing examples of approaches taken by courts in Cali-
fornia and Minnesota that represent a tempered approach to assisting suicide
jurisprudence).
157. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016) (“A person commits assisting suicide
when, with intent to assist another person in committing suicide, he aids and
abets him in committing or attempting to commit suicide.”).
158. State v. Dixon, 282 Neb. 274, 295, 802 N.W.2d 866, 886 (2011).
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-206 (Reissue 2016).
160. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 716, 924 N.W.2d 711, 722–23 (2019). In-
deed, no American jurisdiction today criminalizes suicide or the attempt to com-
mit suicide. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
161. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716, 924 N.W.2d at 723.
162. This is because aiding and abetting requires an underlying criminal act from
which to derive accomplice liability. Id. Because suicide is not a crime, the vic-
tim’s suicide cannot constitute an underlying crime from which to derive accom-
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define aiding and abetting under Nebraska’s assisting suicide
statute.163
Because there is no criminal liability for aiding and abetting with-
out an underlying crime, the Stubbendieck court was not restricted to
applying the definition of aiding and abetting as established by Ne-
braska complicity jurisprudence.164 Rather, the court was free to use a
different standard for determining liability under Nebraska’s assist-
ing suicide statute165 because it was analyzing the sui generis166
crime of assisting suicide rather than criminal liability derived from
the actions of a principal defendant.167 The court’s strict adherence to
common law aiding and abetting principles was thus not a foregone
conclusion.168
B. The Stubbendieck Standard Is Overly Broad
The standard of aiding and abetting, by encompassing “mere en-
couragement,” is overly broad; it holds defendants accountable for
deaths that cannot reasonably be attributed to their conduct.169 As
discussed above, the spectrum of conduct potentially qualifying as as-
sisting suicide ranges all the way from active participation in
plice liability. See supra section II.A (explaining that no American jurisdiction
criminalizes suicide in modern times).
163. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016). To make matters worse, the jury in
Stubbendieck was not provided with the definition of “aids and abets” in the con-
text of assisting suicide. See Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 31:15.
164. It would make sense to apply common law theories of accomplice liability to as-
sisting suicide if suicide itself was a crime. Indeed, because suicide was a crime in
medieval England, this is the approach medieval English courts took in punish-
ing suicide assistance, conspiracy to commit suicide, and attempted suicide. See
supra section II.A (explaining the history of assisting suicide laws). However, be-
cause suicide is no longer a crime, applying common law theories of accomplice
liability to the crime of assisting suicide is not appropriate because there is no
underlying crime at issue.
165. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307.
166. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining assisting suicide as a sui
generis offense).
167. See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text (discussing that suicide is not an
underlying crime from which accomplice liability can be derived).
168. For preferable alternatives that the Nebraska Supreme Court could have taken,
see infra section V.C.
169. See Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at 84. Binder and Chiesa argue that verbal
encouragement that does not provide information essential to completing a sui-
cide lacks a causal nexus to the death of the victim. They further posit that where
the defendant merely provides inconsequential encouragement of suicide, the vic-
tim’s suicidal act should be viewed as a superseding cause. See also Shaffer,
supra note 3, at 360 (arguing that holding defendants liable for inconsequential
assistance of suicide is unreasonable and does not serve the underlying policies of
assisting suicide statutes).
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death,170 on one extreme, to passive assistance,171 on the other ex-
treme.172 The standard set by Stubbendieck seems to place Nebraska
on the latter extreme, where mere encouragement of suicide amounts
to assisting suicide.173
1. The Stubbendieck Standard Inappropriately Criminalizes
Trivial Assistance
The Stubbendieck standard criminalizes acts that intuitively do
not amount to felony criminal conduct.174 For example, imagine a sit-
uation where a victim attempted or committed suicide after the defen-
dant told the victim to kill himself during a heated argument. If the
defendant intended to assist the victim in committing suicide when
the statement was made, that defendant could be found to have aided
and abetted a suicide.175 Considering another example, a defendant
could be convicted for offering a terminally ill family member support
and encouragement in her decision to take her own life.176 Although
intuitively it is senseless to hold either of these hypothetical defend-
ants criminally liable for the death of the victim, such conduct is ar-
guably encouragement of suicide under the Stubbendieck standard.177
Minimal assistance, such as mere encouragement of suicide, is gen-
erally too far removed from a victim’s death and the public policy con-
170. See, e.g., In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1183 (Cal. 1983); Fister ex rel. Estate of
Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 194, 201 n.8 (Md. 2001); People v. Kevor-
kian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 734 (Mich. 1994).
171. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2020); In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d
620, 632 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn.
2014); Williams v. State, 53 So. 3d 734, 745–46 (Miss. 2010); State v. Stub-
bendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 716, 924 N.W.2d 711, 723 (2019).
172. See supra Part IV (discussing the spectrum of conduct potentially constituting
assisting suicide).
173. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716–17, 924 N.W.2d at 722–23 (explaining that mere
encouragement of suicide can constitute assisting suicide).
174. See infra notes 175–99 and accompanying text (explaining how the Stubbendieck
standard is overly broad).
175. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 910 (2020). The defendant in Carter was convicted of involuntary manslaugh-
ter (Massachusetts does not have an independent criminal statute for assisting
suicide) for verbally encouraging her depressed boyfriend to kill himself. Al-
though the Carter defendant’s conduct exceeded the conduct in this hypothetical
because she actually helped the victim plan the suicide during their discussions,
Carter provides an illustration of a defendant being held criminally responsible
for the death of another due to entirely verbal conduct.
176. In similar circumstances in 1975, Palm Springs, California authorities declined
to press charges against a man who stood by while his terminally ill wife killed
herself because the man “had acted out of ‘love and compassion.’” No Charges in
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/10/05/archives/
no-charges-in-suicide.html [https://perma.unl.edu/PSH4-AY5H].
177. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 716–17, 924 N.W.2d at 722–23 (explaining that mere
encouragement of suicide can constitute assisting suicide).
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siderations undergirding assisting suicide statutes to justify
punishment.178 As one writer noted: “When the act of assistance is so
slight that the encouragement provided to the suicidal individual was
probably de minimus [sic], there is little reason to bring the force of
criminal sanctions for assisting suicide to bear.”179 This is because
punishing trivial assistance does not serve the primary utilitarian
goal of assisting suicide statutes: protecting human life.180 Inconse-
quential encouragement of suicide that does not actually cause a vic-
tim to commit suicide or attempt to commit suicide—such as where
the victim would have attempted or committed suicide regardless of
the defendant’s encouragement—does not endanger human life.181
Additionally, where the defendant’s assistance is inconsequential to
the victim’s death in this way, punishment or threat of punishment
does not serve the purpose of assisting suicide statutes in protecting a
victim’s life.182 In such cases, whatever societal benefits assisting sui-
cide laws may have are substantially outweighed by the heavy crimi-
nal penalties inflicted on defendants.183 Punishing mere
encouragement of suicide also forces courts to draw the incredibly
blurred line between criminal suicide encouragement and innocuous
conduct such as advocating for the right to suicide.184
178. Shaffer, supra note 3, at 360 (arguing that minimal assistance in a victim’s sui-
cide is too far removed from a victim’s death to justify punishment considering
the policy justifications of assisting suicide). See also Joshua Dressler, Reforming
Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
427, 435–37 (2008) and the discussion in subsection V.B.2 on the role of causation
in assisting suicide laws.
179. Shaffer, supra note 3, at 360. Shaffer does an excellent job critiquing the
problems with many assisting suicide statutes and proposes a model assisting
suicide statute based on policy considerations. Id. at 372–76.
180. The predominant policy rationale for assisting suicide laws is that the State’s
interest in preserving life is greater than an individual’s desire for death, espe-
cially when such an individual is otherwise healthy. See supra section II.B (dis-
cussing public policy considerations underlying assisting suicide laws).
181. In such a circumstance, one cannot say the defendant’s conduct is a factual cause
of the victim’s suicide or attempted suicide because the harm to the victim would
still have happened regardless of any conduct by the defendant. See Dressler,
supra note 178, at 435–37 and the discussion in subsection V.B.2 for information
on the role of causation in assisting suicide laws.
182. See supra section II.B (discussing the predominant policy rationale for assisting
suicide laws—the State’s interest in protecting life is greater than an individual’s
desire for death).
183. See supra text accompanying note 179.
184. Sweeney, supra note 25, at 948 (discussing that, where jurisdictions punish ver-
bal encouragement of suicide, courts could conceivably find criminal liability
where defendants merely advocate for a broad right to suicide).
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2. The Stubbendieck Standard Problematically Lacks a
Proximate Causation Requirement
In assisting suicide cases, verbal encouragement is distinct from
verbal assistance, such as providing instruction on how to implement
the means of suicide thereby enabling a victim to commit suicide.185
Perhaps unsurprisingly, research has not uncovered a single reported
case where a defendant was convicted of assisting suicide for mere
verbal encouragement.186 Courts’ reluctance to characterize verbal
encouragement as assisting suicide can be traced to the nature of cau-
sation in assisting suicide statutes.187 Some jurisdictions that prohibit
“aiding” suicide do not require the defendant to cause (directly or indi-
rectly) the death of the victim, likely reflecting the lack of any causa-
tion requirement in traditional complicity law.188 For example, as
colorfully noted by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the requisite en-
couragement or assistance need not be “persuasive, direct, or signifi-
cant,” and “encouragement ‘in any manner’ is sufficient to constitute
the crime.”189
As explored below, courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted
assisting suicide statutes to require a proximate causal link between
the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s death or attempted sui-
cide.190 The Nebraska Supreme Court in Stubbendieck did not require
a proximate causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the vic-
tim’s death,191 making assisting suicide a so-called “conduct crime”
rather than a “result crime” (meaning that the social harm caused by
the crime is the encouragement or assistive conduct instead of the re-
185. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.
Ct. 910 (2020) (finding defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter when de-
fendant suggested the means of suicide and provided verbal instructions on im-
plementing such means); State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn.
2014) (finding that defendant’s alleged suggestion of the means of suicide, to-
gether with defendant’s alleged instructions on how to implement such means,
constituted “assistance” rather than “encouragement” under Minnesota’s assist-
ing suicide statute).
186. Binder & Chiesa, supra note 41, at 115.
187. Id. at 113 (discussing that some jurisdictions do not require the defendant to
cause the death of the victim to be guilty of assisting suicide).
188. See id. (“Another problematic feature of these statutes is that they extend liabil-
ity for manslaughter to intentional assistance of suicide that does not cause
death.”).
189. Williams v. State, 53 So. 3d 734, 745–46 (Miss. 2010).
190. See infra section V.C (discussing preferable alternative approaches taken by
courts in California and Minnesota). For example, California courts require “di-
rect” and “active” participation in the events leading to the suicide. In re Ryan N.,
112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632 (Ct. App. 2001); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr.
187, 197–98 (Ct. App. 1988). Minnesota courts require conduct that enables the
victim to commit suicide. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 23.
191. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 716–17, 924 N.W.2d, 711, 722–23 (2019)
(explaining that mere encouragement of suicide can constitute assisting suicide).
762 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:736
sult of death).192 This simply cannot be what the Nebraska Legisla-
ture intended, as policy justifications establish assisting suicide as a
classic result crime.193 The dominant policy rationale for punishing
assisting suicide is clearly framed in terms of a harmful result: The
loss of human life.194
The lack of a causation requirement is unsettling and will likely
lead to unjust results.195 Causation in criminal cases is a fundamental
means by which courts assess a defendant’s culpability.196 Causation
requirements are essential for ensuring proportional punishment for
the conduct and resulting harm at issue.197 In assisting suicide cases,
where there is no principal defendant from whom to derive liability
and no underlying crime, jurisdictions that convict defendants of as-
sisting suicide for inconsequential verbal encouragement in effect do
away with causation requirements and unjustly punish defendants for
deaths that cannot reasonably be attributed to their conduct.198 After
Stubbendieck, Nebraska is such a jurisdiction.199
C. Narrowing the Scope: The California and Minnesota
Approaches
The Nebraska Supreme Court must narrow the scope for aiding
and abetting suicide by adopting one of the approaches taken by
courts in jurisdictions with similar assisting suicide statutes.200 For
instance, California courts qualify the actus reus of the offense by
192. A “result crime” is focused on prevention of or punishment for a harmful outcome
while a “conduct crime” is focused on preventing or punishing an act. For exam-
ple, murder is a “result crime” defined by the harmful result, the death of a
human being. Driving while intoxicated is a “conduct crime” solely defined by the
act, regardless of whether it causes any harm. DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note
115, at 133.
193. See supra section II.B (discussing public policy considerations underlying assist-
ing suicide laws). Because the primary policy justification for assisting suicide
laws is the protection of human life, assisting suicide is a result crime focused on
preventing or punishing a harmful social outcome, the loss of human life.
194. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that the primary policy jus-
tification for assisting suicide laws is the State’s desire to protect human life).
195. See infra notes 196–97, and accompanying text (discussing that causation is es-
sential for assessing a defendant’s culpability and proportionally punishing de-
fendants for the conduct at issue).
196. See Dressler, supra note 178, at 435–37 (examining the importance of causation
requirements for criminal laws).
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 178–97 and accompanying text (arguing that defendants should
not be criminally liable for assisting suicide where the conduct at issue is mere
verbal encouragement).
199. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 716–17, 924 N.W.2d 711, 722–23 (2019) (ex-
plaining that mere encouragement of suicide can constitute assisting suicide).
200. See infra notes 201–35 and accompanying text (discussing preferable alternative
approaches taken by courts in California and Minnesota).
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reading a sort of proximate causation requirement into the statute.201
Minnesota courts invalidate the prohibition against inconsequential
verbal encouragement on First Amendment grounds.202
1. The California Approach: Implicit Proximate Causation
Requirement
California’s assisting suicide statute is very similar to Ne-
braska’s203 in that it criminalizes “aiding and abetting” suicide, in-
cluding encouraging or advising another to commit suicide.204
However, California courts refuse to hold defendants criminally liable
for merely giving inconsequential advice or encouragement.205 In-
stead, the State must prove that the defendant engaged in “the direct
aiding and abetting of a specific suicidal act. . . . Some active and in-
tentional participation in the events leading to the suicide are re-
quired in order to establish a violation.”206
By requiring the defendant’s conduct to be specifically and directly
related to the victim’s suicidal act, California punishes egregious con-
duct that has a proximate causal relationship to a specific act of sui-
cide.207 At the same time, conduct that could not have reasonably led
to the victim’s death (even if it constitutes encouragement) is beyond
the scope of punishment under this approach.208 Additionally, the
201. California courts require “direct” and “active” participation in the events leading
to the suicide. In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632 (Ct. App. 2001); McCol-
lum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197–98 (Ct. App. 1988).
202. Specifically, Minnesota courts require conduct that enables the victim to commit
suicide. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014).
203. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (Reissue 2016).
204. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2020) (“(a) Any person who deliberately aids, ad-
vises, or encourages another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony. (b) A person
whose actions are compliant with the provisions of the End of Life Option Act . . .
shall not be prosecuted under this section.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (“A person
commits assisting suicide when, with intent to assist another person in commit-
ting suicide, he aids and abets him in committing or attempting to commit
suicide.”).
205. California courts require “direct” and “active” participation in the events leading
to the suicide. Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at
197–98.
206. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197–98.
207. California’s requirement that the defendant participate directly and actively in
the victim’s death imposes a requirement of proximate causation as defined by
the Supreme Court of California. See State Dep’t of State Hosps. v. Superior
Court, 349 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Cal. 2015) (discussing that a core consideration in
assessing proximate cause is the nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the
injury to the victim).
208. See supra note 207 (discussing California courts’ requirement of proximate causa-
tion). Minimal assistance, such as mere encouragement of suicide, is generally
too far removed from a victim’s death to justify punishment. See supra section
V.B (discussing conduct that could not have reasonably led to the victim’s death,
such as inconsequential encouragement).
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California approach gives courts much-needed discretion in determin-
ing what constitutes “direct” and “active” participation in the events
leading to the suicide.209 Such discretion allows courts to ensure that
convictions serve policy goals and punish morally culpable defendants
who have subverted the will of their victims for their own benefit.210
Though this discretion also carries with it the risk that courts will
apply the law inconsistently,211 the California approach better serves
policy goals—particularly that of protecting human life—and is well
worth the potential risk of inconsistent outcomes.212
2. The Minnesota Approach: Proximate Causation Required Via
Strict Scrutiny Under the First Amendment
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has taken a very different, yet
compelling, route by interpreting its assisting suicide statute to mean
that the State may not convict defendants for acts of inconsequential
encouragement.213 Minnesota’s assisting suicide statute makes it a
felony to “advise,”214 “encourage,”215 or “assist”216 a victim in taking
the victim’s life.217 In the landmark case of State v. Melchert-Dinkel,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the State could prosecute a
209. See supra Part IV (discussing the wide-ranging ways courts have interpreted and
applied the nebulous concepts of “active,” “direct,” and the like in assisting sui-
cide cases).
210. Indeed, California courts fundamentally view proximate cause as a tool used to
enforce public policy considerations. See State Dep’t of State Hosps., 349 P.3d at
1022 (discussing how California courts use proximate cause to limit an actor’s
liability in light of public policy considerations).
211. Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 424–25 (2007) (discussing how dis-
cretion is one factor that can lead to inconsistent outcomes and fundamental
unfairness).
212. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining that the primary policy jus-
tification for assisting suicide laws is the State’s desire to protect human life).
213. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014).
214. In the context of assisting suicide, the Supreme Court of Minnesota interpreted
the verb “advise” to mean “to ‘[i]nform.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Advise,
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1993)).
215. In the context of assisting suicide, the Supreme Court of Minnesota interpreted
the verb “encourage” to mean “to ‘[g]ive courage, confidence, or hope.’” Id. at 23
(citing Encourage, THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (4th ed.
1993)).
216. In the context of assisting suicide, the Supreme Court of Minnesota defines “as-
sist[ance]” as “speech or conduct that provides another person with what is
needed for the person to commit suicide.” Id. at 23.
217. MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2019) (“Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or as-
sists another in taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for
not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or
both . . . Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another who at-
tempts but fails to take the other’s own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for
not more than seven years or to payment of a fine of not more than $14,000, or
both.”).
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defendant for “assisting” suicide but, on First Amendment grounds,
could not prosecute a defendant for “encouraging” or “advising” an-
other to commit suicide.218 Specifically, the court concluded that the
prohibition against “assisting” suicide, as opposed to “encouraging” or
“advising” another to commit suicide, was narrowly drawn to serve the
State’s compelling interest in preserving human life.219
In the context of assisting suicide, the Melchert-Dinkel court de-
fined “assistance” as conduct that enables the victim to commit sui-
cide.220 Notably, this standard does not prohibit prosecution based on
verbal encouragement or assistance per se.221 Rather, it prohibits
prosecution based on tangentially related verbal encouragement, and
requires such verbal actions by the defendant to have a direct causal
link to the victim’s death.222 The court even directly addressed the
issue of causation, explaining: “Prohibiting only speech that assists
suicide, combined with the statutory limitation that such enablement
must be targeted at a specific individual, narrows the reach to only the
most direct, causal links between speech and the suicide.”223
3. Implications for Nebraska Post-Stubbendieck
The judicial interpretations issued by courts in California and Min-
nesota limiting the scope of their states’ respective assisting suicide
laws thus take very different analytical routes but end up with similar
conclusions.224 The California approach of reading a narrower actus
218. 844 N.W.2d at 16.
219. Id. at 23.
220. Id.
221. Id. (“While enablement perhaps most obviously occurs in the context of physical
assistance, speech alone may also enable a person to commit suicide. Here, we
need only note that speech instructing another on suicide methods falls within
the ambit of constitutional limitations on speech that assists another in commit-
ting suicide.”).
222. Id. (“Unlike the definition of ‘assist,’ nothing in the definitions of ‘advise’ or ‘en-
courage’ requires a direct, causal connection to a suicide.”).
223. Id. In directly tying culpability to proximate causation and refusing to hold that
entirely verbal conduct could never constitute assisting suicide, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota wisely recognized that in some highly unusual cases mere
verbal conduct could be the proximate cause of a victim’s suicide. For instance, in
the only reported case in which a defendant incurred criminal liability for helping
another commit suicide through entirely verbal conduct, the defendant in Com-
monwealth v. Carter was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for verbally en-
couraging her depressed boyfriend to kill himself. 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020). Carter’s completely verbal conduct was clearly
the proximate cause of the victim’s death because she gave the victim the idea for
how to kill himself and instructed him as to how to carry out the suicide. Id.
Carter provides an excellent illustration of a defendant being held criminally re-
sponsible for the death of another due to entirely verbal conduct.
224. Namely, both approaches require a direct causal link between the defendant’s
conduct and the victim’s death. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the direct causal link required under both approaches).
766 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:736
reus into the statute and the Minnesota approach of invalidating the
statutory prohibition of inconsequential encouragement on First
Amendment grounds both function to require a more direct, proximate
causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s death.225
Consider the earlier examples of an individual telling another in
an argument to kill himself or a person offering reassurance and sup-
port to a terminally ill family member in her decision to commit sui-
cide.226 Under either the California or Minnesota approach, the
defendant in both illustrations would not be subject to criminal liabil-
ity for assisting suicide.227 Under the California approach, neither act
could reasonably be considered active participation in a specific sui-
cidal act.228 As for the Minnesota approach, the verbal encouragement
of both defendants would be protected under the First Amendment
because (in the absence of additional facts such as the victim’s mental
incapacity) the encouragement in question did not enable the victim to
take his or her own life.229 Thus, by supplying a much-needed causa-
tion element, each approach places defendants whose actions cannot
reasonably be responsible for the suicide of another outside the scope
225. The Supreme Court of Minnesota recognized that its invalidation of the statutory
prohibition of inconsequential verbal encouragement would require a direct
causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s death. Melchert-
Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 23. California’s requirement that the defendant partici-
pate directly and actively in the victim’s death similarly imposes a requirement of
proximate causation as defined by the Supreme Court of California. See State
Dep’t of State Hosps. v. Superior Court, 349 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Cal. 2015) (discuss-
ing that a core consideration in assessing proximate cause is the nexus between
the defendant’s conduct and the injury to the victim).
226. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text (setting forth hypotheticals in-
volving assisting suicide).
227. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text (explaining that under either the
California or Minnesota approach neither of the hypothetical defendants would
be subject to criminal liability for assisting suicide).
228. California courts require “direct” and “active” participation in the events leading
to the suicide. See supra subsection V.C.1. In these two hypotheticals, neither
defendant is “directly” or “actively” participating in the victim’s death (for exam-
ple, by providing the means of suicide or instructions for a method of suicide that
the victim otherwise would have been unaware of). Rather, the conduct of the
defendants in both examples is only tangentially related to the suicidal act.
229. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Melchert-Dinkel defined prohibited suicide “as-
sistance” as conduct that enables the victim to commit suicide. 844 N.W.2d at 23.
With regard to the hypotheticals, neither defendant’s conduct could be said to
have enabled the victim’s suicide because the statements of the defendants did
not provide the victims with the resources necessary to commit suicide. These
hypothetical situations should be contrasted with highly unusual circumstances
such as those present in the case of Commonwealth v. Carter, where the victim’s
suicide would not have occurred without the verbal conduct of the defendant. 115
N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020).
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of prosecution, while still holding defendants responsible for conduct
that endangers the lives of suicidal individuals.230
Remarkably, the Stubbendieck opinion is entirely devoid of refer-
ences to assisting suicide jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, despite
being Nebraska’s first231 judicial interpretation of a statute that bears
a strong resemblance to statutes that have been analyzed in depth in
other states.232 It is disappointing that the Stubbendieck opinion does
not discuss the First Amendment considering a critical portion of
Stubbendieck’s conduct consisted entirely of verbal encouragement.233
The evidence in Stubbendieck was damning enough that the Nebraska
Supreme Court could have applied a more tempered approach, such as
those taken by courts in California and Minnesota, and achieved the
same result without establishing such a needlessly? broad stan-
dard.234 It should not hesitate to do so in the future.235
VI. CONCLUSION
After more than forty years, the Stubbendieck opinion has finally
provided criminal law practitioners in Nebraska with guidance on the
meaning of aiding and abetting suicide.236 However, in establishing
the scope for assisting suicide, the Nebraska Supreme Court created a
standard that is overly broad.237 A defendant may participate some-
what actively and directly in the victim’s death (conduct that in some
jurisdictions would amount to homicide)238 and still only be convicted
230. See Dressler, supra note 178, at 435–37; see also supra section V.B (discussing
the role of causation requirements in assisting suicide laws).
231. See supra note 3 (discussing that the Stubbendieck case is the first judicial inter-
pretation of Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute).
232. State v. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. 702, 924 N.W.2d 711 (2019). Notably, Califor-
nia’s assisting suicide statute is very similar to Nebraska’s in that it criminalizes
“aiding and abetting” suicide, including encouraging or advising another to com-
mit suicide. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2020).
233. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723.
234. See supra section V.B (arguing that the standard established by the Stubbendieck
holding is overly broad).
235. If history is any indication, it will likely be many years before the Nebraska Su-
preme Court revisits the issue of assisting suicide. See supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that the Stubbendieck case was the first time that a
Nebraska court was able to interpret Nebraska’s assisting suicide statute, de-
spite the fact that the statute had been in effect for more than forty years).
236. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
237. See supra section V.B (arguing that the Stubbendieck opinion establishes an
overly broad standard for assisting suicide and forgoes proximate causation re-
quirements traditionally required for criminal convictions).
238. Compare Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 717, 924 N.W.2d at 723 (finding Stub-
bendieck guilty of assisting suicide after he admitted to temporarily smothering
the victim and obtaining morphine, which he gave to the victim ostensibly with
the intent that she use the drug to kill herself), with People v. Cleaves, 280 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 148–49 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding the defendant guilty of homicide where
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of aiding and abetting suicide.239 Conversely, mere verbal encourage-
ment of suicide (presumably even inconsequential encouragement
that does not actually cause the suicide or attempted suicide of the
victim) can constitute aiding and abetting suicide.240
Nebraska should adopt an approach like that taken in California
or Minnesota to narrow the scope of assisting suicide so as to require a
proximate causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and
the victim’s death.241 Such approaches are more reasonably tailored
to achieve the public policy goals of assisting suicide statutes.242 The
next time the Nebraska Supreme Court reviews a conviction for as-
sisting suicide, it would be wise to consider the detailed jurisprudence
of assisting suicide law in jurisdictions with similar statutes.243 Hope-
fully, this time, it will not take more than forty years to achieve such
resolution.244
the defendant held the victim’s body in place while the victim strangled himself);
State v. Sexson, 869 P.2d 301, 305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (finding the defendant
guilty of homicide where the defendant held a rifle aimed at the victim while the
victim pulled the trigger); and People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (Sup. Ct.
2010) (finding the defendant guilty of homicide where the defendant held a knife
in place and in a position to deal maximum damage while the victim repeatedly
thrust himself on knife). The defendant’s conduct in each of these cases arguably
involves at least the same level of participation in the victim’s death as Stub-
bendieck’s participation in Sullivan’s death, yet Stubbendieck was only charged
with and convicted of assisting suicide, whereas the defendants in each of the
other cases were convicted of homicide.
239. Stubbendieck, 302 Neb. at 705–06, 924 N.W.2d at 716–17.
240. Id. at 716–17, 924 N.W.2d at 722–23 (explaining that mere encouragement of
suicide can constitute assisting suicide).
241. See supra section V.C (discussing preferable alternative approaches to assisting
suicide jurisprudence taken by courts in California and Minnesota).
242. See supra Part II (discussing the policy justifications of assisting suicide stat-
utes); see also supra Part V (arguing that assisting suicide statutes which require
a proximate causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s
death are reasonably tailored to achieve policy justifications).
243. See supra section V.C (discussing the similarities between Nebraska’s assisting
suicide statute and those in California and Minnesota and arguing that the ap-
proaches taken by courts in California and Minnesota are preferable to the ap-
proach taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Stubbendieck).
244. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
